Reaction-time and eye-fixation data are analyzed to investigate how people infer the kinematics of simple mechanical systems (pulley systems) from diagrams showing their static configuration. It is proposed that this mental animation process involves decomposing the representation of a pulley system into smaller units corresponding to the machine components and animating these components in a sequence corresponding to the causal sequence of events in the machine's operation. Although it is possible for people to make inferences against the chain of causality in the machine, these inferences are more difficult, and people have a preference for inferences in the direction of causality. The mental animation process reflects both capacity limitations and limitations of mechanical knowledge.
Understanding the operation of deterministic systems, such as mechanical or electronic devices, includes the ability to infer the state of one component of the system given information about the states of the other system components and the relations between the components. This type of understanding is central to how people design, troubleshoot, and operate devices. This article describes how people infer the motion of components of a simple mechanical system (a pulley system) from knowledge of the configuration of the system and the movement of one of the system components. It provides an account of the process of inferring motion, the type of knowledge that allows people to infer motion, and the characteristics of human information processing that constrain the inference process. I refer to this process as mental animation.
Mental Animation

Mechanical Reasoning
Mechanical reasoning has previously been characterized as a process of running a mental model of a machine (de Kleer & Brown, 1984; Forbus, 1984; Gentner & Stevens, 1983; Reiger & Grinberg, 1977; Williams, Hollan, & Stevens, 1983) . These accounts suggest that the inferential processes involved in mechanical reasoning involve mentally simulating the operation of the system. The usefulness of mental models as a theoretical construct has been questioned, because of terminological inconsistencies, lack of precision, and limitations on the testability of the theoretical proposals (Rips, 1986; Rouse & Morris, 1986) . Rather than arguing for or against the construct of a mental model, the approach taken in this article is to investigate in what senses and to what extent the mental processes involved in reasoning about a mechanical system are isomorphic to the physical processes in the operation of the system.
The mental animation task investigated in this study involves imagining the related motions of components in a mechanical system. In other tasks in which people have to imagine a series of spatial manipulations, such as paperfolding or surface-development tasks used in tests of spatial abilities (French, Ekstrom, & Price, 1963) , solution time is proportional to the number of spatial manipulations that need to be performed, suggesting an isomorphism between the physical processes and their mental analogs (Shepard & Feng, 1972) . Because all components of a mechanical system move simultaneously, if the mental process is physically isomorphic to the motion in the machine, all components of the machine should be mentally animated at once. An alternative possibility, explored in this article, is that the components of the machine are animated piecemeal.
Possible Accounts of Mental Animation
As a specific example of mental animation, consider the pulley system depicted in Figure 1 . What are the mental processes involved in inferring how each component of the pulley system will move when the rope is pulled? In this section possible accounts of the mental animation of this type of system are outlined.
One possible account is that the mental animation process simulates the physical behavior of the device. When the rope of the pulley system is pulled, all of the components move simultaneously. Because people's representations of mechanical phenomena are probably based on perception of mechanical systems in operation (Kaiser, Proffitt, & McCloskey, 1985; McCloskey, 1983) , it is possible that these representations reflect the actual behavior of the system. Thus, a person might determine the motion of a component in a pulley system by mentally animating the whole system at once and then determining how the component in question is moving in his or her animated representation of the system. Anecdotal accounts of the reasoning of prominent scientists and engineers suggest that the ability to animate a system all at once may be characteristic of expert reasoning (Ferguson, 1977; Shepard, 1978) . However, given the limited capacity of working memory (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Miller, 1956) , it is unlikely that novices can mentally animate all the components of a machine at once, unless the machine is very simple.
An alternative account is that the mental animation process simulates the kinematics of the system piecemeal. It has been proposed that mental models of specific machines or devices consist of rules allowing the reasoner to infer the states of individual components of the machine from the states of other adjacent components (de Kleer & Brown, 1984; Forbus, 1984; Reiger & Grinberg, 1977; Williams et al., 1983) . Note that there are two differences between the proposed accounts: (a) whether the components are animated all at once or piecemeal and (b) whether the animation process involves spatial-visualization processes or more abstract rules of inference. Only the first of these differences is directly investigated in this article.
According to the piecemeal hypothesis, mentally animating a system consists of a series of cognitive processes in which the individual components are animated one by one rather than being animated in a single process. For example, in the case of the pulley system in Figure 1 , the kinematics of the system components might be inferred by making a chain of inferences beginning with the knowledge that the free end of the rope is being pulled. From this knowledge, the reasoner might first infer the motion of the upper pulley and then infer the motion of each successive component, ending with the inference that the weight is being lifted. I refer to this as inferring the causal chain of events in the system, reflecting the fact that the immediate cause of the motion of each component is the motion of the adjacent component that precedes it in this chain of events.
If subjects mentally animate a system piecemeal, they may not necessarily infer the motion of components in order of the causal chain of events. For example, to infer the motion of a component later in the causal chain of events (e.g., the lower pulley in Figure 1 ), subjects might first infer that when the rope is being pulled, the weight is being lifted (which presumably is included in people's general knowledge of pulley systems). Subjects might then infer the motion of the lower pulley from the motion of the weight. In this case the direction of inference would be in the opposite direction to the causal chain of events (i.e., from a later component to an earlier one). The experiments reported in this article examine the order in which people infer the motion of components of a pulley system or whether people determine the motion of all components at once.
The existing empirical evidence does not differentiate between these accounts of mental animation. Providing subjects with causal models of machines improves their ability to operate and solve problems about machines (Kieras & Bovair, 1984; Mayer, 1989) , but it is not clear how causal models are used in subjects' reasoning. The time to determine the state of a component in a system is related to the complexity of the system (Spoehr & Horvath, 1989) . However, this could indicate that subjects are making a chain of inferences or that they determine the states of all components at once within a capacity-limited system. Therefore, the more components there are in the system, the more time it will take to animate the system.
A Theoretical Framework
To formalize the previously described accounts of mental animation and to test their specific predictions, I describe the accounts within the framework of a production system. This ensures continuity with previous theoretical accounts of reasoning about physical systems in particular (Fallside, 1988; Hegarty, Just, & Morrison, 1988; Kieras, 1984 Kieras, , 1990 Larkin & Simon, 1987) and higher level cognitive skills in general (Anderson, 1983; Newell & Simon, 1972) . The proposed production system model is a theory of how the mental animation process is decomposed but not of the algorithm that performs the mental animation process. As stated previously, the evidence presented in this article does not differentiate between a process of matching production rules against a propositional representation of a mechanical system or a more analog process of transforming a mental image of a mechanical system. The model consists of a declarative representation of a static pulley system and a set of inference rules for deriving the kinematic representation of the pulley system from the static representation.
Representation of a static pulley system. A static pulley system can be represented as a structural description, consisting of objects and spatial relations between these objects (Hegarty et al., 1988; Larkin & Simon, 1987) . For the purposes of this article I define the basic objects in the pulley system as units whose motion can be described by a single transformation. This necessitated the representation of ropes as subdivided into rope strands. For example, the lower rope in Figure 1 was subdivided into three strands: the left side of the rope, which shortens when the pull rope is pulled; the section lying under the lower pulley, which moves to the right under the pulley; and the right side of the rope, which moves up. This specific decomposition of the system is largely intuitive. However, the notion of subdivision of the pulley-system representation is central to the piecemeal hypothesis.
The basic objects in the representation are pulleys, rope strands, weights being lifted by the pulley system, and stationary objects in the environment to which the pulleys and ropes can be fixed, the ceiling or floor. The Appendix lists the objects in the static representation of the pulley system depicted in Figure 1 and the spatial relations between these objects. An object is defined as fixed if it is connected to an environmental object (the ceiling or floor) and as attached if it is connected to an object that is free to move (e.g., a free pulley). In addition to these connections, rope strands can lie over or lie under a pulley. Finally, if an object is not connected to another object, it is free.
Representation of a pulley system in motion. The kinematic representation of a pulley system describes the movements of the components that result when the free end of the rope is pulled. Pulleys, rope strands, and the weight can move up or move down. Pulleys can rotate clockwise or rotate counterclockwise. Rope strands can move to the right or left, over or under a pulley. Finally, rope strands can lengthen or shorten. The Appendix lists the motions of the pulley system components when the rope in Figure 1 is pulled. In the Appendix the statements are presented in the order of the causal chain of events from the input of the pulley system (i.e., the rope being pulled) to its output (i.e., the weight being lifted). In this ordering, it is assumed that the movement of a rope strand over a pulley causes the pulley to rotate and that the shortening of a rope strand that lies under a pulley causes the pulley to rise.
Inferring the kinematic representation from the static representation. The process of inferring the kinematic representation from the static representation can be accomplished by a set of production rules in which the conditions are the spatial relations between pulley system components and the motion of one of these components and in which the action is the inference of the motions of the other components. For example, the following production would infer the motion of the rope strand hanging over the upper pulley (see the Appendix, Motion 2 in The Kinematic Model) from the knowledge that the free end of the rope is moving down.
IF a rope strand (RS1) lies over a pulley and it is attached to another rope strand (RS2) on the right and RS2 is moving down THEN infer that RSI is moving to the right over the pulley.
Again, the actual inference process carried out under these conditions might be a process of imaging the movement of the pull rope and pulley.
The basic question I address in this study is how people infer the kinematics of a pulley system from a static description of the system. If subjects propagate through the causal chain of events in the system to mentally animate the pulley system, then their knowledge is best described by a set of production rules relating the motion of each pulley system component to the components that it affects directly. If subjects can infer the motion of components from nonadjacent components (e.g., the pull rope and the weight), then productions linking the motion of these components should be included in the model. Finally, if subjects determine the motion of all components at once, then their knowledge is best described by more complex production rules in which the conditions include the configuration of a whole pulley system and the actions include inferring the motions of all the components of the pulley system. Thus, further specification of the model is based on the empirical data and is described later.
Experiment 1
I investigated the mental animation process using a sentence-picture verification task. I showed subjects a diagram of a pulley system and a sentence describing either a static property or a kinematic property of one or more components of the system and required them to verify whether the sentence correctly described the pulley system depicted in the diagram. If the sentence described a static property of the system (i.e., the spatial relation between two components), then the task was a standard sentence-picture verification task, which involves constructing representations of the text and the diagram and comparing these representations (Carpenter & Just, 1975; Clark & Chase, 1972) . If the sentence described a kinematic property of the system (i.e., the movement of one or more components), then the task involved the process of mental animation in addition to these encoding and comparison processes.
I asked subjects to determine the motion of system components at the beginning, middle, and end of the causal chain. If subjects determine the motion of a component by making a chain of inferences from the input of the system, then the time to verify the motion of a particular component should be an increasing function of its distance from the beginning of the causal chain. If subjects can infer the motion of components from either the beginning or the end of the kinematic chain, then statements about components in the middle of the causal chain should take longest to verify. If subjects infer the motion of all components at once, then the animation time should be equal for all components.
Experiment 1 contrasts the verification of sentences describing static and kinematic properties of pulley systems and examines how the position of a component in a pulley system affects a subject's accuracy, response latency, and eye fixations. Eye-fixation data have provided important insights into a number of other cognitive tasks that involve operating on a spatial display, for example, reading (Just & Carpenter, 1987; Rayner & Pollatsek, 1989) , processing subtitles (D'Ydewalle, Muylle, & Van Rensbergen, 1985; D'Ydewalle, Van Rensbergen, & Pollet, 1987) , scene perception (Loftus, 1972; Loftus & Mackworth, 1978) , mental rotation (Just & Carpenter, 1976 , sentence-picture verification (Just & Carpenter, 1976) , visual analogies (Carpenter, Just, & Shell, 1990) , and construction of mental models from text and diagrams (Hegarty, in press; Hegarty & Just, 1991) . These studies assume that when a person is using a visual display to perform a cognitive task, the part of the display that he or she is fixating at any point in time corresponds to the symbol that he or she is currently processing in working memory (Just & Carpenter, 1976) . For example, if a subject determines the motion of a given component of a mechanical system by mentally animating the system components from the beginning of the chain to this component, then he or she should fixate components of the system that precede the given component in the causal chain of events.
Method Subjects
Eleven undergraduate students from the University of California, Santa Barbara, participated in Experiment 1 for course credit.
Stimuli and Apparatus
Each stimulus was composed of a sentence on the left of the screen and a diagram of a pulley system on the right (see the examples in Figure 2 ). The subjects' task was to state whether the sentence was true or false of the depicted pulley system.
The sentences described either static relations between components of the pulley system or kinematic events that occur when the free end of the pull rope is pulled. The referents of these sentences were components in three different locations in the pulley system, components involved in interactions (a) toward the beginning of the causal chain of events in the system, (b) in the middle of the causal chain, and (c) toward the end of the causal chain. Figure 2 gives examples of a static and a kinematic relation between objects at the end of the kinematic chain. An example of a statement about a kinematic event at the beginning of the causal chain would be "the rope moves to the right over the upper right pulley." An example of a kinematic event in the middle of the causal chain would be "the lower pulley turns counterclockwise." I presented subjects with the pulley system diagrams in Figures 1  and 2 and the mirror images of these diagrams (producing left and right isomers of the two systems). From now on, the system in Figure  1 is referred to as Pulley System 1 and the system in Figure 2 as Pulley System 2. Half of the sentences were true, and half were false. For each combination of the other factors there were two sentencediagram pairs, yielding a total of 96 unique sentences. I presented these sentences in two blocks of 48 stimuli each, and the subjects saw each block twice, for a total of four blocks and 192 trials. Half the subjects saw Block 1 first, and half saw Block 2 first. I presented stimuli in a random order within each block. I included the false trials in order to make the verification task realistic, but no effort was made to standardize their difficulty. Thus, I analyzed only the true trials (96 trials).
I presented the stimuli on a DEC VR 260 Monochrome video monitor, situated approximately 3 m from the subject. The subjects' eye fixations were monitored using an Iscan corneal-reflectance and pupil-center eye tracker (Model RK-426), which has a resolution of less than 1° of visual angle. The tracker sampled the position of the subjects' gaze every 16 ms and output the x and y coordinates to a DEC Vaxstation 3200. Further processing of the data is described later.
Procedure
First, the experimenter presented written and verbal instructions, which introduced the subjects to pulley systems and to the labels used to refer to the pulley system components in the stimuli. After these instructions, a headrest was fitted comfortably to the subject's head, and the subject was asked to move as little as possible during the experiment. After the eye-tracking equipment had been calibrated, the subject was asked to fixate on an asterisk that appeared in the top-left corner of the screen and to push a button to begin and end each trial. As soon as the subject pressed the button, a sentence and diagram appeared on the screen. The subject viewed the sentence and diagram and responded by saying "true" or "false" and by pressing a button labeled true or false. I later checked the verbal and manual responses for consistency, and if they were inconsistent I used the verbal response.
Results and Discussion
Static Slatemeni:
The upper left pulley is attached to the ceiling Kinematic Statement:
The upper left pulley turns counterclockwise Figure 2 . Pulley System 2 and sentences describing static and kinematic relations among the system components.
Errors
The overall error rate was low (6.5%). As Figure 3 shows, subjects made more errors verifying kinematic relations than static relations between components, F(\, 10) = 12.54, p < .01, MS e = 0.01. Subjects also made more errors verifying statements about components at the end of the causal chain of events than at the beginning and middle, F(2, 20) = 6.05, p < .01, MS e = 0.01. There was a significant interaction between type of statement (static or kinematic) and position of the referent in the pulley system, F(2, 20) = 8.49, p < .01, MS e = 0.01, such that position had a greater effect on errors in verifying kinematic relations, F(2, 20) = 7.63, p < .01, MS C = 0.01, than in verifying static relations, F{2, 20) = 3.13, p = .07, MS C = 0.001. Although there was a trend for subjects to make fewer errors on the second repetition of the stimuli (M = 0.05, SD = 0.11) than the first (M = 0.08, SD = 0.15), this was not statistically significant (F = 1.21). None of the other factors had significant effects on errors. 
Reaction Time
The mean reaction times for different trial types are indicated by the height of the bars in Figure 4 . These data are based on correct trials only, but the results do not change appreciably if error trials are also included in the analysis. There was a practice effect such that subjects had faster reaction times on the second repetition of the stimuli, M = 5.45 s, SD = 1.96, than on the first repetition, M = 6.67 s, SD = 2.19, F(l, 10) = 74.75, p < .001, MS, = 1.3. Because practice did not interact with any other factor, I collapsed reaction times over repetitions. I analyzed the reaction times for the two pulley systems separately because of configural differences between the two pulley systems.
As Figure 4 shows, subjects spent more time verifying kinematic statements than static statements about both pulley systems, F(\, 10) = 35.35, p < .001, MS, = 2.19, for Pulley System 1, and F{\, 10) = 83.84, p < .001, MS, = 1.17, for Pulley System 2. This is consistent with the proposal that verifying kinematic relations involves the process of mental animation in addition to the processes of encoding and comparing the representation of the text and diagram.
For statements about both pulley systems, there was a significant effect of referent location on reaction time, F(2, 20) = 9.29, p < .01, MS, = 1.21, for Pulley System 1, and F(2, 20) = 17.21, p < .01, MS, = 1.02, for Pulley System 2, and a significant interaction of location with type of statement (static or kinematic), F(2, 20) = 17.63, p < .001, MS, = 1.32, for Pulley System 1, and F(2, 20) = 25.81, p < .001, MS, = 0.49, for Pulley System 2.
As Figure 4 shows, the reaction times for kinematic trials increased from the beginning to the end of the causal chain, and simple effects analyses revealed a significant effect of location on verification times for statements about kinematic events in both pulley systems, F(2, 20) = 14.97, p < .001, MS, = 2.11, for Pulley System 1, and F(2, 20) = 25.69, p < .001, MS, = 1.16, for Pulley System 2. This is consistent with the proposal that subjects mentally animate pulley system components by imagining a causal chain of events from the input of the system so that they spend more time verifying sentences that describe kinematic events later in this causal chain.
In contrast, these trends were not observed in the verification times for statements about static relations. Thus, the trends were not due to differences in subjects' ability to locate and encode information about components at different positions in the pulley system. For static statements about Pulley System 1, the effect of location on the verification of static relations, F(2, 20) = 7.01, p < .01, MS, = 0.42, was due to longer verification times for statements about the middle pulley. The spatial relations of the middle pulley to other system components are particularly complex, because the upper rope lies under this pulley and the lower rope is attached to it. For static statements about Pulley System 2, there was no effect of location of the components (F< 1).
In conclusion, errors and reaction times increased with the distance of the referent from the beginning of the causal chain. This effect is consistent neither with an account of mental animation in which all components of a pulley system are animated at once nor with an account in which components at the end of the causal chain are inferred from the motion of the weight. Furthermore, the effect was not observed for static stimuli, indicating that it is not due to differences in subjects' ability to locate or encode information about components at different positions in the pulley system. The results suggest that people animate pulley systems in increments by inferring a causal chain of events from the input of the system. 
Development and Evaluation of a Model of Mental Animation
I matched the reaction-time and eye-fixation data to a production system model that infers the kinematics of a pulley system in such an incremental manner. This model begins with a representation of a static pulley system and the movement of the pull rope and infers the movement of each successive component in the causal chain, stopping when the motion of the component in question is determined. Thus, the model simulates the mental animation stage but not the encoding and comparison stages of the experimental task. The productions express relations between spatially adjacent components so that the movement of a component can only be inferred from knowledge of the motion of another component that touches it (i.e., is fixed to, is attached to, lies over, or lies under the component) and is earlier in the causal sequence of events in the system. Thus, the model predicts the number of inferences required to determine the motion of any component in a pulley system. Table 1 lists the model's predictions of the number of inferences required to verify the true sentences describing kinematics for both pulley systems. The chain of events listed in the Appendix (The Kinematic Model section) corresponds to the order in which the component motions in Pulley System 1 are inferred within the model, with the exception that the direction of rotation of a pulley is determined only if this rotation is the referent of the sentence to be verified.
The model was evaluated in terms of its ability to predict the location of subjects' eye fixations. The first hypothesis I tested is that the time to verify a sentence describing the movement of a pulley system component is proportional to the number of inferences required to determine that component's motion. The second hypothesis I tested is that to verify the motion of a component, subjects inspect that component and components whose motions occur earlier in the causal chain of events in the pulley system.
Time spent inspecting the diagram. As Figure 4 shows, a breakdown of reaction time into time spent reading the text and time spent inspecting the diagram indicated that reaction time differences are largely due to differences in diagram inspection time.
1 Time spent inspecting the diagram was highly related to the number of inferences required to verify a kinematic statement (see Table 1 ). A regression analysis in which this was the single independent variable accounted for 90% of the variance in diagram time, F(\, 22) = 201.53, p < .001, MS, = .11. The slope of the regression equation indicated that the estimated time to infer the movement of a component in these pulley systems is 0.44 s. The intercept (1.10s) was close to the average time to verify static statements (1.34 s), which is consistent with the fact that both are measures of the time to encode and compare the information in a sentence and a diagram without the additional mental animation process. Furthermore, the intuitive assumption that the movement of a rope strand over a pulley causes the pulley to rotate was supported by the data. At all pulley system locations, it took longer to infer the motion of the pulley than that of the rope strand lying over or under the pulley, F( 1, 10) = 5.01, p < .05, MS C = .703, for Pulley System 1, and F(l, 10) = 3.83, p = .08, MS, = .69, for Pulley System 2.
Location of eye fixations. To further evaluate the model's predictions, I aggregated eye fixations to gazes, consisting of a single fixation or group of sequential eye fixations on a particular sector of the display. The display sectors were rectangles enclosing the pulleys, rope strands, weight, and sections of the ceiling that were defined so that each section contained a single connection to a rope or pulley. The sectors corresponded to the objects in the static representation of the pulley system listed in the Appendix (see Objects section), with the exception that I included the rope strands lying above or below a pulley in the same sector as the pulley.
Time spent inspecting the diagram was classified further as (a) time spent fixating the component (or components) described in the sentence read (the referents of the sentence), (b) time spent fixating pulley system components whose motions occur before the referents in the kinematic chain of events, (c) time spent fixating pulley system components whose motions occur after the referents in the kinematic chain, and (d) time spent fixating all other parts of the display. The order of events presented in the Appendix (see The Kinematic Model section) defined the components whose motions were before or after a given motion in the causal chain of events. This breakdown of reaction time is presented in Figure 5 .
Most of the time spent inspecting the diagram on kinematics trials (M = .91, SD = .08, for Pulley System 1; M = .88, SD = .09, for Pulley System 2) was spent fixating the referents of the sentence and components whose motions precede these in the causal chain of events in the system. To verify statements about the motion of components at the beginning of the kinematic chain, subjects primarily inspected the referents of the statement (M= .84 of time on the diagram, SD = .09, for Pulley System 1; M = .86, SD = .12, for Pulley System 2). There was a linear increase in gaze duration on components before the referent in the chain of events from the beginning to the end of the causal chain (indicated by the hatched portions of the bars in Figure 5 ,7^1, 10) = 33.35,/? < .001, MS, = .86, for Pulley System 1, and F(l, 10) = 23.81, p < .001, MS, = .38, for Pulley System 2.
On kinematics trials, subjects should spend more time inspecting components earlier than the referent in the causal chain than components later in this chain. The most appropriate test of this prediction is to examine trials in which the referent was in the middle of the causal chain, because when the referent is toward the beginning of the causal chain, there are very unequal numbers of components before and after the referent (i.e., relatively few earlier components when the referent is toward the beginning of the causal chain and relatively few later components when the referent is toward the end of the causal chain). In this middle condition, subjects spent more time inspecting components earlier in the causal chain, F(l, 10) = 22.04, p < .001, MS, = .08, for Pulley ' Differences in time spent reading the text in Experiment I are difficult to interpret because the length of the text varied across conditions. System 1, and F(l, 10) = 5.97, p < .05, MS C = .08, for Pulley System 2). It must be noted, however, that subjects did spend some time fixating components after the referent in the causal chain, especially in the case of Pulley System 2. This result suggests that subjects may have sometimes made inferences against the chain of causality, although the strategy of inferring motion from the beginning of the causal chain was clearly dominant. Subjects might also have looked to the end of the causal chain as a check on their answers. Finally, this result might reflect some calibration error in the eye-fixation data because components classified as after the referent were often adjacent to the referent.
When verifying sentences describing static relations, the majority of the time spent inspecting the diagram was spent fixating the referents of the sentence (M = .73, SD = .12, for Pulley System 1; M = .79, SD = .12, for Pulley System 2).
Furthermore, when the referent was in the middle of the causal chain, there was no difference in the amount of time spent inspecting components earlier and later than the referent.
In summary, if one assumes that subjects' eye fixations are indicative of their mental processes (Just & Carpenter, 1976) , then the eye-fixation location data provide support for a model of this mental animation task stating that the components of a pulley system are animated piecemeal, in order of the causal sequence of events in the system.
Strategies
Subjects typically read the sentence before inspecting the diagram (on 98.5% of trials, SD = 1.7), suggesting that their overall strategy was to first construct a representation of the text and then verify this representation against the diagram. To provide further information about subjects' mental animation strategies, I examined the sequence of eye fixations on the diagram for a subset of the mental animation trials. Because subjects typically inspected only the referent when the sentence described an event at the beginning of the causal chain (see Figure 5) , the most interesting sequence data occurred on trials describing events at the middle or end of the causal chain. The eye-fixation sequences of the 11 subjects were examined for the eight trials describing kinematic events at the middle and end of the causal chain in the second block of trials (with the exception of 1 subject's data on one trial in which calibration was lost). Examples of typical sequences of fixations on the text and diagram are presented in Figures 6  and 7 .
If one assumes that subjects fixate the part of the visual display that they are mentally processing at any given time, then the theory suggests that when animating a pulley system, one should inspect the components of the pulley system in a sequence corresponding to their positions in the causal chain. This pattern can be observed in Gazes 2 to 5 and Gazes 7 to 9 of the protocol in Figure 7 and is approximated by Gazes 5 to 12 of the protocol in Figure 6 . In six of the eight trials examined (SD = 1.55), subjects scanned from the beginning of the causal chain to the referent at least once, suggesting that this pattern was typical.
It was also quite common for a subject to first inspect the referent before scanning back to the beginning of the causal chain, as in Figure 6 . On 4.2 of the 8 trials examined, subjects began by fixating the referent (SD = 1.8). This result suggests that the most common strategy was to locate the referent of the sentence in the diagram before mentally animating the pulley system. It may also reflect a process of inferring motion against the direction of causality (i.e., from the referent to an earlier component). This step was not always necessary. In 2.2 of the trials (SD = 1.5) the subject began by fixating a component at the beginning of the causal chain in the pulley system, as in Figure 7 . Subjects often scanned between the referent and other components in the pulley system more than once in a trial. For example, in Figure 7 the subject scanned from the pull rope to the referent (Gazes 2 to 5), then back to the first pulley in the kinematic chain (Gazes 6 and 7), and then forward to the referent again (Gazes 8 and 9). Subjects inspected the referent on average 2.7 times per trial (SD = 1.0). Thus, the mental animation may not always have been successfully completed during the first attempt.
Subjects sometimes reread the text during a trial. They read sentences describing events at the end of the causal chain (2.39 times, SD -.58) more often than sentences describing events at the beginning (1.98 times, SD = .52) or middle (1.97 times, SD = .58) of the causal chain. On these trials the demands of inferring the motion of more components and storing the intermediate results of these computations may have overloaded working memory; therefore, the sentence representation decayed and had to be reactivated by rereading.
Finally, to assess whether any of the previously described characteristics of the protocols were related to success on the mental animation task, I compared the strategies of subjects who made fewer than 10 errors (n = 7, M= 4.60, SD = 3.21) with those who made more than 10 errors (n = 4, M -27.25, SD = 8.96). None of the previously mentioned measures of subjects' strategies significantly differentiated the high-and low-error groups.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the results of Experiment 1 suggest that subjects are able to determine the motion of a component of a pulley system given a static diagram of the system and knowledge of the input motion to the system. The reactiontime and eye-fixation data suggest that the dominant strategy is to determine the motion of a pulley system component by first encoding the configuration of the pulley system and then by tracing the causal chain of events from the input of the system to the component in question. Inspection of the static diagram seems to be central to this mental animation process.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1,1 asked subjects to verify the motion of a pulley system component, given that the free end of the rope in the pulley system was being pulled. Thus, I gave subjects the motion of one component, the pull rope, which is the input to the system, and I required subjects to determine the motion of a component that is later in the causal chain of events. The results suggested that subjects determined the motion of any component by making a chain of inferences from the input of the system to this component. If this characterization of mental animation is correct, then subjects should be able to determine the motion of a component from that of any other component that occurs earlier in the causal chain of events. In Experiment 2 I tested this theory by asking subjects to verify the motion of components of a pulley system given the motion of another component, which was earlier in the kinematic chain, but not the input to the system.
Assuming that subjects determine the motion of a component of a pulley system by making a chain of inferences, if the motion that they are given occurs earlier in the chain of events, then the required inference chain is in the direction of causality. In Experiment 1, rules of inference expressing causal relations between adjacent components accounted for most of the data. However, there was also some suggestion that subjects made inferences against the direction of causality.
In Experiment 2, I required subjects to make inferences either from an earlier component in the causal chain of events in the system or from a later component. Presuming that they can make inferences against the causal chain, there are two possible explanations of this process. First, it is possible that subjects' rules of inference express co-occurrences between component motions that are not necessarily in the direction of causality, for example, "when the rope is moving to the right over the upper pulley, the rope is being pulled." In this case, there should be no differences in errors or reaction times between inferences from an earlier component in the causal chain and inferences from a later component.
Second, it is possible that subjects' rules express only causal relations. In this case, subjects should have more difficulty making inferences from a later event in the causal chain than from an earlier event. When given a later event, one possible strategy is backward chaining (i.e., making a chain of inferences in which an earlier component is located and the subject infers what motion of this earlier component causes the motion of the later component). Another possible strategy is to infer both the given motion and the motion in question from the input of the system (i.e., in the direction of causality).
Method Subjects
Ten undergraduate students at the University of California, Santa Barbara, participated in Experiment 2 for course credit.
Stimuli and Apparatus
As in Experiment 1, each stimulus was composed of a sentence on the left of the screen and a diagram of a pulley system on the right. The subjects' task was to state whether the sentence was true or false of the depicted pulley system.
The sentences described the motion of one component of the system, given the motion of another component. For example, on one trial, the diagram in Figure 1 was accompanied by the sentence, "When the rope is moving to the right over the upper pulley, the middle pulley is turning counterclockwise." In this sentence, the motion of the rope over the upper pulley is the given motion, and the motion of the middle pulley is the motion in question. The given motion was an event at either the beginning or the end of the causal chain of events in the pulley system (in the case of Pulley System 1, the movement of the rope over the upper pulley and the movement of the rope under the lower pulley, respectively). The motion to be determined was a motion at the beginning, the middle, or the end of the kinematic chain (in the case of Pulley System 1, the movement of the upper, middle, and lower pulleys, respectively).
The diagrams depicted left and right isomers of the two pulley system configurations used in Experiment 1. Half of the sentences were true, and half were false. A false sentence was composed to correspond to each true sentence so that the given motion was the same in both sentences and the motion to be determined was opposite. I presented a total of 48 sentence-diagram pairs in a random order to subjects in one block of trials.
The apparatus and procedure were the same as in Experiment 1.
Results and Discussion
Errors
The error data replicate the distance effects observed in Experiment 1 and suggest that inferences from the end of the causal chain of events are more difficult than inferences from the beginning of the causal chain. The overall error rate in this experiment was 18.0%. As Figure 8 shows, subjects made more errors when the inference process involved tracing more links in the causal chain of events in the pulley system, F(2, 18) = 8.86, p < .01, MS e = .03. There was also a marginally significant trend for subjects to make more errors when the given motion was at the end of the causal chain of events than when it was at the beginning, F(l, 9) = 4.06, p = .07, MS, = .02.
Reaction Time
The overall reaction times for correct trials are represented by the height of the bars in Figure 9 . Inferences from events later in the causal sequence took longer than inferences from events earlier in this sequence, F(l, 9) = 5.33, p < .05, MS t = 21.4, for Pulley System 1, and F{\, 9) = 17.49, p < .01, MS C = 10.8, for Pulley System 2. Thus, the inference process is more effortful when the chain of inferences to be made is inconsistent with the direction of causality, suggesting that the inference rules are directional.
Reaction times for inferences from earlier in the causal chain replicated the results of Experiment 1. Figure 9 shows that for these trials, the time to verify a statement increased with the distance of the motion in question from the given motion, F(2, 18) = 15.16, p < .001, MS C = 12.11, for Pulley System 1, and F(2, 18) = 4.75, p < .05, MS C = 7.8, for Pulley System 2.
In the case of inferences from the end of the causal chain, verification times also increased with distance of the motion in question from the given motion (i.e., they were longest when the motion in question was an event at the beginning of the causal chain and shortest when it was an event at the
Inferences from Earlier
Beginning Middle End End Middle Beginning
Position of the Motion in Question in the Causal Chain Figure 8 . Mean proportion of errors made by subjects in inferring the motion of pulley system components at different positions in the causal chain of events when the given motion was at the beginning of the causal chain (inference from earlier in the causal chain) and when it was at the end (inference from later in the causal chain).
end of the causal chain; see Figure 9 ). However, the increase in reaction time with distance reached statistical significance only in the case of Pulley System 1, F(2, 18) = 3.86, p < .05, MS C = 17.2. I compared reaction times for inferences from earlier and later in the causal sequence to a model of mental animation assuming that people can infer the motion of a component from that of an adjacent component and that the inference takes the same amount of time, regardless of whether this component is earlier or later in the causal chain of events. A multiple regression analysis indicated the relation of the mean time to verify the 48 sentences to two independent measures, the number of inferences predicted by this model (r = .61), and whether the given motion was earlier or later in the causal chain (r = .58). Both variables had significant contributions to the regression equation, r(45) = 3.50, p < .01, for number of inferences, and r(45) = 3.01, p < .01, for location of given motion, and together they accounted for 47.9% of the variance in reaction times, F(2, 45) = 20.68, p < .001, MS e = 7.54.
This model was a better predictor of time to make inferences from earlier in the causal chain (r = .77) than of time to make inferences from later in the causal chain (r = .55). The difference may be due to variability in subjects' strategies for inferring motion from later events in the causal chain, which will be outlined later.
A comparison of the reaction times with those observed in Experiment 1 indicates that the times in Experiment 2 were considerably longer. This was due partially to reading time because the sentences used in this study were longer. However, subjects also spent more time inspecting the diagram in this study, and the regression analyses indicated that the increment in reaction time with each additional inference was greater in Experiment 2 (0.73 s) than in Experiment 1 (0.44 s).
A possible explanation of this result suggests that there were additional storage demands on working memory in Experiment 2 and that these interfered with the speed of the mental animation process. In Experiment 1 the given motion was the same on all trials. It was also the input motion to the system (the rope being pulled). This motion is probably particularly salient for subjects, because presumably subjects know that pulley systems are operated by pulling the pull rope. For these reasons, subjects might not have had to represent the given motion explicitly while performing the mental animation task. In Experiment 2 on the other hand, the given motion varied from trial to trial and was probably not as salient because it was the motion of one of the internal components of the system. In this task it is more likely that the given motion was represented explicitly during the mental animation process. This additional storage demand may have interfered with the speed of the mental animation processes (cf. Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Baddeley & Lieberman, 1978) .
Inferences From Earlier in the Causal Chain
The locations and sequence of eye fixations on the display provided information about the strategies that subjects used to infer motion from an earlier component in the causal chain.
Location of eye fixations. As the height of the bars in Figure 10 shows, gaze duration on the diagram increased with distance of the motion to be determined from the given motion, F(2, 18) = 17.20, p < .001, MS, = 5.56, for Pulley System 1, and F(2, 18) = 10.08, p < .01, MS e = 3.68, for Pulley System 2, and this was due to an increase in gaze duration on components earlier in the chain of eventsshown by the hatched sections of the bars in Figure 10 , F(2, 18) = 39.57, p < .001, MS, = 2.41, for Pulley System 1, and Position of Motion in Question in the Causal Chain Figure 9 . Mean response times to infer the motion of components in a pulley system from events earlier and later in the causal chain, broken down into time spent inspecting the text and time spent inspecting the diagram.
F(2, 18) = 29.78, p < .001, MS, = 1.12, for Pulley System 2. In the middle condition, in which there were approximately equal numbers of components before and after the referent in the causal chain of events, more time was spent inspecting the components before the referent, F(l, 9) = 57.37, p< .001, MS e = 0.25, for Pulley System 1, and F(l, 9) = 22.09, p = .001, MS t = 1.53, for Pulley System 2. Gaze duration on the text, on the component for which motion was in question, and on components later in the kinematic chain did not vary significantly with distance. Sequence of eye fixations. To gain further insight into subjects' strategies, I examined the sequence of eye fixations on the display for the true kinematics trials describing Pulley System 1. As in Experiment 1, the most interesting sequence data occurred on trials in which the motion to be determined was at the middle (two trials) or end (two trials) of the causal chain, because when both the given motion and the motion to be determined were at the beginning of the causal chain, subjects typically inspected only components at the beginning of the chain (see Figure 10) .
As in Experiment 1, subjects switched between processing the text and processing the diagram more often when the motion in question was at the end of the causal chain (4.05 times, SD = .64) than when it was at the middle of the causal chain, 2.55 times, SD = 1.14, tflO) = 4.03,/? < .01. Within a trial, subjects' first inspections were typically on components at the beginning of the causal chain only, suggesting that they first constructed a representation of the given motion (2.4 trials, SD = 1.35) and inferred the motion of the component in question on later inspections.
The pattern of scanning from the beginning of the causal chain to the referent was observed in 2.9 of the 4 trials examined (SD = 1.40), and in almost all of these trials (M = 3.8, SD = 0.42), subjects inspected the beginning of the causal chain before their final inspection of the referent. These patterns suggest the process of inferring the motion in question from the given motion. Subjects' final inspections were often focused on the referent alone, suggesting a final check on the motion in question (in 1.6 trials, SD = 1.35).
Inferences From Later in the Causal Chain
Location of eye fixations. In the case of inferences from the end of the causal chain, time spent inspecting the diagram was again affected by the distance of the motion to be determined from the given motion, F{2, 18) = 6.08, p < .01, MS e = 11.62, for Pulley System 1, and F(2, 18) = 2.67, p < .10, MS e = 5.91, for Pulley System 2 (see Figure 10) . This was largely due to an increase in gaze duration on components after the component in question, F(2, 18) = 13.24, p < .001, MS e = 6.83, for Pulley System 1, and F(2, 18) = 15.27, p < .001, MS e = 3.43, for Pulley System 2, shown by the open sections of the bars in Figure 10 . This result is consistent with a model of mental animation in which people can infer an earlier event in the causal chain from a later event. However, subjects also spent a greater amount of time fixating components earlier in the causal chain when the component in question was at the middle or end of the causal chain, F(2, 18) = 6.26, p < .01, MS e = 0.76, for Pulley System 1, and F(2, 18) = 6.63, p < .01, MS e = 0.43, for Pulley System 2. Furthermore, in the middle condition, the time spent inspecting later components significantly exceeded the time spent inspecting earlier components only in the case of Pulley System 2, F( 1, 9) = 66.99, p < .001, MS, = 0.34. These results would not be predicted by a model in which inferences from later in the causal chain are made purely by backward chaining.
Sequence of eye fixations. The location of subjects' eye fixations on the display provided further insight into the inference process, suggesting that when the given motion is an event at the end of the causal chain, subjects animate the component in question by backward chaining, by inferring its motion from the beginning of the causal chain, or by a combination of these strategies.
I examined the eye-fixation protocols for all 10 subjects for trials in which the given motion was at the end (2 trials) or the middle (2 trials) of the causal chain. If subjects use the backward chaining strategy, then they should begin by inspecting components at the end of the causal chain and scan from these components to the middle of the pulley system. In fact, subjects were as likely to begin by inspecting components at the beginning of the causal chain (1.4 trials, SD = 1.4) than at the end (1.2 trials, SD = 1.3) on these 4 trials (on the remaining trials they began by inspecting the referent). Furthermore, although the pattern of scanning between the end of the causal chain and the referent occurred during the majority of these 4 protocols (3.4, SD = 0.69), the protocols typically also included inspections on components at the beginning of the causal chain (2.4 trials, SD = 1.07). These data suggest that subjects attempted to infer the motion in question both from the end and from the beginning of the causal chain. Although there were individual differences in how often subjects inspected the beginning of the causal chain, all subjects did so on at least 1 of the 4 trials examined.
This combination of strategies is illustrated by the eyefixation protocol in Figure 11 , in which the motion in question is in the middle of the causal chain. On this trial, the subject's first two diagram inspections (Fixations 2 and 4) are on the upper pulley, a component at the beginning of the causal chain. The subsequent diagram inspections include scans both between the referent and the end of the causal chain (Fixations 6 to 8 and Fixations 13 to 15) and between the upper pulley and the referent (Fixations 10 to 13).
These data support the view that subjects' rules of inference are in the direction of causality. The data suggest that subjects' default preference is to infer the motion of a component from the beginning of the causal chain of events in the machine. This default strategy is not completely overcome by the more appropriate strategy of backward chaining on trials requiring inferences from the end of the causal chain.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the results of Experiment 2 supported the theory that subjects determine the motion of pulley system components by making a chain of inferences to determine the motion of successive components. These results add to the account of mental animation by showing that subjects can make inferences against the direction of causality. This process is effortful and appears to compete with the default strategy of inferring the motion of the system from the beginning of the causal chain, suggesting that subjects' rules of inference are directional and that inferences against the causal chain of events are more effortful. Finally, assuming that the given motion is represented more explicitly in this experiment, and that this additional storage demand interferes with the rate of mental animation, the results of Experiment 2 suggest further evidence of capacity limitations in the mental animation process.
General Discussion
Mental animation is the process of inferring the kinematics of a mechanical system from information about the static configuration of the system. The research presented in this article suggests that when people mentally animate a pulley system, they decompose their representation of the machine into smaller units corresponding to the machine components and animate these components in a sequence corresponding to the causal sequence of events in the machine's operation. Although people can make inferences against the chain of causality in the machine, these inferences are more difficult and people have a preference for making inferences in the direction of causality. Thus, for the task studied in this research, the mental animation process is more isomorphic to the causal sequence of events in the machine's operation than to the physical movement of the machine in which all components move at once.
These results provide empirical support for the view that running a mental model of a mechanical system involves applying a set of causal rules to determine the states of successive components of the system. Although this theory of mechanical reasoning has been well developed in the artificial intelligence literature (de Kleer & Brown, 1984; Forbus, 1984; Reiger & Grinberg, 1977) , there have been few attempts to study it empirically (e.g., Spoehr & Horvath, 1989) . This study provides a precise specification of this theory for one specific mechanical reasoning task and shows that this can account for on-line measures of cognitive processing, such as reaction times and eye fixations.
Limitations of the Mental Animation Process
A major conclusion of this study is that the mental animation process is limited. People cannot mentally animate a mechanical system all at once at the level of detail required in this task, but they do so in increments. There are two possible reasons that this task decomposition is necessary. One possibility is that it is due to capacity limitations (i.e., that the process of animating a whole pulley system at once overloads working memory). Another possibility is that it is due to knowledge limitations (i.e., that people only have knowledge of the kinematic relations between spatially contiguous components in a mechanical system).
Several of the results in this article can be interpreted as effects of working memory limitations. First, the account of mental animation proposed in this article is an example of the general strategy of decomposing a complex problem into subproblems that are manageable within the constraints of working memory (Carpenter et al., 1990) . Second, subjects were more likely to reread the text on trials that involved animating more components, suggesting that the animation task interfered with the storage of the text representation. Third, the difference in the rate of mental animation observed in Experiments 1 and 2 can be interpreted by assuming that the given motion is represented more explicitly in the task in Experiment 2 and that this additional representation decreases the rate. The second and third points reflect the trade-off between storage and processing in working memory (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Baddeley & Lieberman, 1978; Carpenter & Just, 1989) . It is clear that these interpretations are highly speculative given the data collected to date on the mental animation task. They could be tested more directly in future experiments by observing subjects' ability to mentally animate systems of different complexity or by observing the mental animation process under memory-load conditions. The data also suggest that knowledge is limited in that people are not able to infer the motion of a component of a pulley system from any other component, only from adjacent components. Furthermore, if the reported effects were due to capacity limitations alone, there would not have been a difference between the processes of inferring motion from the beginning and end of the causal chain, as was observed in Experiment 2.
In the proposed model the limitations are expressed as knowledge limitations. The production rules in the model only express relations between spatially contiguous compo-nents. This type of knowledge base is an efficient method of storing mechanical knowledge, because it ensures that people have the ability to infer the kinematics of any novel mechanical system, provided that they have knowledge of the local interactions between components of the system. If mechanical systems were animated all at once, then it would be necessary to have a separate and complete knowledge structure for inferring the kinematics of every individual mechanical system with which one is familiar, and in this case, mechanical knowledge would be highly redundant.
The theory of mechanical knowledge presented here does not exclude the possibility that people develop more complex knowledge structures corresponding to a complete mental model of mechanical systems with which they are highly familiar. In fact, it is likely that with familiarity, the groups of related components of a mechanical system are chunked (cf. Chase & Simon, 1973; Egan & Schwartz, 1979) so that instead of analyzing a mechanical system into individual components, the system is analyzed into groups of components that directly affect each others' motions. By the mechanism of production composition (Anderson, 1983) , the production rules proposed here could be combined to form more complex productions, which allow the motions of such a group of components to be inferred all at once. Thus, the intuitions of gifted scientists and engineers that they can imagine the operation of a familiar mechanical system all at once (Ferguson, 1977; Shepard, 1978) are not implausible. However, the amount of practice that subjects received in this experiment was not sufficient to produce significant chunking effects. Although a practice effect was observed in Experiment 1, practice did not affect the slope of the reaction time curve, which would be the case if chunking had occurred.
Visual-Spatial Processes in Mental Animation
The eye-fixation data suggest that inspection of the relevant part of the visual display is related to the mental animation process. There are several possible interpretations of this relation between diagram inspection and internal inference processes. First, it is possible that eye fixations on the visual display might relieve the subject of the need to store a static representation of the system; therefore, more mental capacity can be devoted to the animation processes. Second, as Larkin and Simon (1987) proposed, the visual display might serve to index the information that must be related in solving a problem, so that subjects' fixations on the display might allow them to focus on a particular subgoal of the problem or to keep track of their progress in solving a problem. Third, subjects' eye movements might mediate their determination of the movement of the system components. That is, the process of imagining that an external object is moving might be accompanied by the movement of parts of one's own body, including eye movements. The precise roles of the visual display in a task such as mental animation need to be investigated in future research. One possible future approach would be to monitor how mental animation is affected when the static display is not present for the duration of the task.
A related question concerns the extent to which the inference of motion involves spatial visualization processes. Although the current model is expressed as a production system, the current understanding of this task does not differentiate between a rule-based inference process and one based on spatial visualization. The role of spatial visualization in mental animation could be investigated in experiments, modeled after Brooks (1968) , in which students are given either a spatial or a nonspatial interference task to perform while mentally animating a diagram.
Development of the Model
The production system model described in this article is quite successful in accounting for the reaction time data and the location of subjects' eye fixations. The central proposals of this model, that the mental animation process is piecemeal and that it is isomorphic to the causal sequence of events in the system, are well supported by the data. However, the model also includes some more specific proposals that are less central to the theory (e.g., that the movement of the rope over a pulley and the rotation of the pulley are separate events). Although the data supported some of these specific proposals, the proposals are largely intuitive at present and need to be tested further in future research.
The current model has some other limitations. It accounts for aggregate performance across subjects rather than the performance of individual subjects. The small number of subjects in this study did not allow for more than a cursory examination of individual differences. However, there was large variation among subjects in both reaction times and eyefixation patterns, and an account of these individual differences should contribute to the theory of mental animation. Second, an important addition to the model would be to impose working memory limitations on the mental animation process. Third, the model of mental animation should eventually be embedded in a more complete model of the sentence-picture verification task, which includes the encoding and comparison processes in this task and the process of selecting a mental animation strategy.
Generality of the Results
To develop a precise specification of the mental animation process, it was necessary to confine the task analysis and empirical investigation to a specific mental animation task, the inference of the motions of individual components of a pulley system. Pulley systems are typical machines in that they are composed of elementary components that constrain each others' motions and work together to achieve the function of the machine. Thus, a model of the type described here might also account for mental animation of many other types of machines that fit this description, although the basic components of these machines and the relations between their motions would be different. In fact, the model described here is similar to a more general production system model developed by Kieras (1984 Kieras ( , 1990 to simulate mental models of a variety of electronic devices in that in both cases, the inference of system behavior is based on a declarative description of the configuration of the system, also known as the device topology.
There are also some aspects of the model that one would not expect to generalize to other mechanical systems. For example, many systems such as pumps and electrical circuits do not have a distinct input and output, but they are more cyclical in their operation. People might be more flexible in being able to mentally animate these systems given the state of any component in the system. Furthermore, many complex machines have multiple potential causal chains so that mental animation of these machines might first involve identifying a causal chain to use in inferring kinematics.
Finally, answering different questions about the same mechanical system may involve different processes. For example, it does not appear to involve a chain of inferences to determine that when the rope of a pulley system is pulled the weight moves up, possibly because this motion is directly related to the function of a pulley system. Furthermore, answering quantitative questions (e.g., how high the weight will rise when the rope is pulled by a given amount) or questions about pulley system dynamics have been found to be more difficult than the questions asked in this study and to involve processes such as counting the ropes in the system (Hegarty et al., 1988) . The mental animation process studied in this research is probably just one of a number of strategies that people have at their disposal when they are required to infer the behavior of deterministic systems. Future research will identify the conditions under which this process is used and how it varies for different systems and for the inference of different types of information.
